




In the reputation model of Klein & Leﬄer (1981) ﬁrms refrain from
cutting quality or price because if they did they would forfeit future proﬁts.
Something similar can happen even in a static setting. First, if there exist
some discerning consumers who can observe quality, ﬁrms wish to retain their
purchases. Second, if all consumers can sometimes but not always spot ﬂaws,
ﬁrms do not want to lose the business of those who would spot them on a
given visit. Third, if the law provides a penalty for fraud, but not one so
high as to to make fraud unproﬁtable, ﬁrms may prefer selling high quality
at high prices to low quality at high prices plus some chance of punishment.
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Often buyers cannot rely on contracts to guarantee the quality of the
goods or services they purchase. The transaction cost is too high or courts
are too expensive to enforce any contracts that might be written. Yet some
sellers do dependably provide high quality despite the extra proﬁt they could
generate by cheating on any one purchase. Buyers trust those sellers, and are
willing to pay them a high price for their high quality. Somehow, competition
does not erode the resulting proﬁts.
Benjamin Klein & Keith Leﬄer (1981) give one explanation. In equilib-
rium a seller with a good reputation can sell at a price above marginal cost.
He could produce low quality and earn a big one-time proﬁt, but buyers
would react by never buying from him again. If he produces high quality, his
immediate proﬁts will be less, but they will nonetheless be positive and he
will continue to earn them indeﬁnitely. For this to happen, the equilibrium
price must be high enough to make him prefer high quality and stable prof-
its to low quality and immediate proﬁt. The positive proﬁts will persist in
equilibrium because buyer would correctly deduce that any seller charging a
lower price would be irresistably tempted to produce low quality.
The Klein-Leﬄer model is based on one equilibrium of an inﬁnitely re-
peated game, and repetition with a long horizon is essential to it. In a one-
period version of the model, the long-term gain from stable proﬁts would van-
ish and only the one-shot gain from cheating on quality would remain. The
present paper will show that the idea of quality-maintaining proﬁts is not lim-
ited to multi-period games, however. In the Klein-Leﬄer model, the seller’s
deterrent to cheating is the loss of future proﬁts, but quality-maintaining
proﬁts can arise in a one-period model if the seller’s loss from cheating is
some other kind of proﬁts. I will show this by laying out three ways that
proﬁts can arise even in a one-period setting.
First, however, it will be useful to distinguish the present setting from
diﬀerent ways of thinking about product quality and reputation. The main
alternative is to assume that the problem is not to gain an incentive to
produce high quality, but to convince other players of a quality that is already
high and cannot be varied. Rogerson (1983) was an early model of this, in
which high-quality ﬁrms’s sales would increase over the long run. The insight
of Nelson (1974) is that if a ﬁrm’s quality is high, then it has more incentive
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money on advertising, that is a proﬁtable strategy if its quality is high, but
not if it is low, because the proﬁt margin in equilibrium is not great enough to
justify the advertising. Kihlstrom & Riordan (1984) and Milgrom & Roberts
(1986) model the idea formally as a signalling model. Bagwell & Riordan
(1991) take the same kind of signalling model of incomplete information,
but make price the signal rather than advertising. Prices start high in early
periods of a market, signalling high quality, but fall as information gradually
becomes public. Roberson (1983) and Linnemer (2002) combine the two ideas
of advertising and prices as signals into one model, in which both signals
are used by ﬁrms of intermediate quality. Farrell (1986) (see also his 1980
dissertation) also takes the approach of quality that is unchanging over time,
but he allows entrants to choose quality initially, and his emphasis is on how
it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to enter successfully, as the consumer surplus
earned from incumbent ﬁrms makes switching increasingly unattractive.
It has also proved interesting to combine adverse selection and moral
hazard, asking what happens when ﬁrms diﬀer in type, but some ﬁrms are
capable of producing either low or high quality. Diamond (1989) and Horner
(2002) are two examples of this approach that yield the outcome that over
time a ﬁrm’s reputation and incentives for high quality can improve as it
consistently shows good results to its trading partners.
Other articles move attention away from consumers and onto ﬁrms, lim-
iting the number of ﬁrms so they interact strategically (e.g. Hertzendorf
& Overgaard [2001], Fluet & Garella [2002]) or having ﬁrms compete hor-
izontally in quality as well as vertically (Daughety & Reinganum [2006]).
Kirmani & Rao(2000) survey the literature.
The product-quality literature discussed so far is about adverse selec-
tion, not moral hazard. Its starting point is quality that once ﬁxed cannot be
changed. Less attention has been given to models in which product quality
is chosen anew each period. That situation, the one in Klein & Leﬄer (1982)
is subject to the Chainstore Paradox of repeated games, that if the inter-
action is repeated a ﬁnite number of times, then the only subgame perfect
equilibrium will have low quality in each period. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts &
Wilson (1982) show how the Chainstore Paradox can be avoided by adding
a small amount of incomplete information to the game—which in the case of
3product quality would be a small probability that the ﬁrm can only produce
high quality. With a long enough time horizon, this can result in a high-
quality equilibrium. For one example of a model constructed on this basis,
see Maksimovic & Titman (1991), which shows how a ﬁrm’s capital structure
interacts with its product quality choice.
A number of papers have looked at moral hazard in various contexts.
Some make the Informed and Uninformed Consumers assumption that I will
use in this paper. In the search model of Chan and Leland (1982), consumers
diﬀer in their costs of acquiring information about price and quality. Firms
can choose their level of quality. When price is known but quality informa-
tion is costly to acquire, the equilibrium has a single price but two levels of
quality, one for the informed and one for the uninformed consumers. That is
in a search context, but several other modellers have used the informed vs.
uninformed consumer assumption in a non-search context: Farrell (1980),
Cooper & Ross (1984) and Tirole’s Theory of Industrial Organization (1988,
p. 107) . All three assume that some consumers are informed of quality
and some are not, that there is only one period of production, and that the
ﬁrm has a choice between low and high quality. In chapter 2 of Farrell’s
1980 doctoral dissertation, the emphasis is on the externality that the pres-
ence of informed consumers exert on uninformed consumers. In Cooper &
Ross’s model, ﬁrms have U-shaped cost curves and there is free entry. If a
competitive equilibrium exists, some ﬁrms sell low quality and some high,
with the amount of high quality increasing with the proportion of informed
consumers and the steepness of the average cost curve at subeﬃcient scales.
Tirole models a monopoly with constant returns to show that a monopolist
may choose high quality even if not all consumers can observe his choice.
Wolinsky (1983) is based on something similar to the Consumer Error
assumption I will use below. is a search model in which consumers visit ﬁrms
and obtain noisy signals of quality. Firms are identical in costs, and choose
their quality levels and prices. Consumers diﬀer in their willingness to pay
for quality, so that in equilibrium there can be a variety of price- quality pairs
oﬀered, quality rising with price. An increase in the quality of information
reduces prices.
In the present article, I will go back to fundamentals, and look at moral
hazard in a competitive industry where ﬁrms use identical technologies with
4constant returns to scale and have a choice between high and low quality.
Most of the literature has focussed on multi-period models, relying on future
sales to give the ﬁrm an incentive for present high quality. I will start by
assuming multiple periods, but I will follow that by letting the discount rate
become inﬁnite. The paper’s message will be that the idea that a ﬁrm chooses
high quality to avoid losing a fraction of its sales applies even if future sales
are unimportant, and that the key result that price will exceed marginal
cost even in a competitive market obtains regardless of the source of the
lost sales. This can be modelled much more simply than in earlier product
quality models. The ideas that diﬀerences in consumer information or errors
can aﬀect product quality are well known, but I will show how similar they
are to the way that Klein-Leﬄer reputation can maintain product quality.
In addition, the idea that even weak laws against fraud can maintain high
quality in the same manner seems to be completely new.
2. The Model
We will use a formalization of Klein & Leﬄer (1982) similar to Rasmusen
(1989) but with an exogenous measure of ﬁrms. Firms and consumers are
atomistic, lying on the [0,1] interval. First, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose
qualities and prices. Second each consumer observes the prices, but not the
qualities, and decides which one of the ﬁrms, if any, to visit. Third, after
visiting a ﬁrm, each consumer decides whether to buy one unit or not based
on what he observes about quality as described in Assumptions A1 and A2
below, and the government may intervene as described in Assumption A3. If
the consumer does buy, the ﬁrm produces the unit and the consumer pays.
Finally, the ﬁrm pays the production cost, each consumer consumes what he
has bought, and all consumers discover the quality of all ﬁrms. This process
is repeated an inﬁnite number of times.
A ﬁrm pays c = ch per unit to produce high quality and c = cl to
produce low quality, with 0 < cl < ch.
Consumers value high quality at v = vh > ch and low quality at v =
vl = cl, so high quality is eﬃcient.
Thus, the per-period payoﬀ functions are, if a ﬁrm sells N units





v − p if he buys
0 if he does not buy (2)
We will assume that all payments are made at the start of periods and that
the discount rate is r > 0.
The model departs from the standard reputation model by adding the
following three assumptions:
(A1) (Consumer Error) If the quality is low, then with probability 0 ≤ α < 1
the consumer observes that fact– he “spots the ﬂaw,” but with probability
(1 − α) he receives no information. If the quality is high, he receives no
information.
(A2) (Informed and Uninformed Consumers) If a consumer is one of the
fraction 0 ≤ β < 1 of consumers that are “discerning” he observes quality
perfectly once he visit the seller.
(A3) (Weak Laws) If a ﬁrm tries to sell low quality as high, then with prob-
ability 0 ≤ γ < 1 independent of α and β the government interrupts the
transaction and ﬁnes the seller amount F.
To simplify the strategy descriptions, we will assume that ﬁrms never
follow the negative-proﬁt strategy of p < cl (otherwise we need to encumber
the consumer strategies with caveats about how they might visit low-quality
ﬁrms because of give-away prices). By “equilibrium” I will mean a perfect
bayesian equilibrium, where the need for out-of-equilibrium beliefs arises not
because the game has incomplete information but because a player’s devia-
tion move might change beliefs about his unobserved earlier or later moves.
Unless the expected government punishment γF is high enough for a
fraudulent ﬁrm, there is no equilibrium in which quality is high and the price
equals marginal cost. In such an equilibrium, p = ch and ﬁrms would earn
zero proﬁts. A ﬁrm could deviate to low quality and make positive proﬁts,
because its deviation payoﬀ would be:
πfirm(low quality) = θ(p − cl) − γF, (3)
which is positive if γF is low enough, since p = ch and θ > 0. We will assume
that
γF < θ(ch − cl), (4)
6because otherwise we attain the ﬁrst-best because the expected punishment
alone makes deviation to low quality unproﬁtable. Given that inequality
(4) is satisﬁed (and, as we will see later, vh is not too low), our inﬁnitely
repeated game has an inﬁnite number of equilibria. We will focus on two
of them, which we will call the pessimistic equilibrium and the optimistic
equilibrium.
Note that if we had assumed that the ﬁrm paid the production cost
before the government detected and cancelled the fraudulent sale, and that
the ﬁrm could not resell the product, then the payoﬀ from low quality would
be:
πfirm(low quality, ) = θ(p − cl) − γF − γcl. (5)
In eﬀect, the lost production cost would be part of the punishment, and it
would allow γF to take a lower value than the bound in inequality (4) and
still deter low quality.
The Pessimistic Equilibrium
The Firm: The ﬁrm chooses its quality to be low and its price to be p = cl.
The Consumer: A consumer visits any of the ﬁrms with the lowest price.
He buys if p ≤ v and he observes the quality.
He buys if p ≤ cl if he does not observe the quality.
Consumer out-of-equilibrium beliefs: If p > cl, quality is low.
The pessimistic equilibrium exists regardless of the parameter values. It
is ineﬃcient because both producer and consumer payoﬀs equal zero,whereas
if the ﬁrm and consumer had traded high quality there would have been gains
from trade.
The Optimistic Equilibrium
The Firm: In equilibrium, the ﬁrm chooses high quality and the price
p = p∗, where if we deﬁne the probability of successfully completing a sale
as:
θ ≡ (1 − α)(1 − β)(1 − γ), (6)
7then the price is:
p
∗ ≡ ch +
rθ(ch − cl)
1 + r − rθ
−
rγF
1 + r − rθ
. (7)
If the ﬁrm has ever deviated to low quality or to p < p∗ in the past, it
chooses low quality and p = cl.
The Consumer: The consumer never visits a ﬁrm that has produced low
quality or charged p 6= p∗ in the past. Of the remaining ﬁrms, he visits the
ﬁrm with the lowest price such that p ≥ p∗, or no ﬁrm if all prices are less
than p∗.
If he observes the quality, he buys if p ≤ v.
If he does not observe the quality, he buys if p ∈ [p∗,vh].
Consumer out-of-equilibrium beliefs: If p < p∗, the consumer believes
that the quality is low. If p > p∗, he believes that the quality is high.
The optimistic equilibrium requires explanation. Consumer behavior
is easy to justify. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms produce high quality, so even
an undiscerning consumer is safe in paying up to vh for the product. So
long as p∗ ≤ vh he will buy it; if p∗ > vh then this equilibrium does
not exist. Out of equilibrium, we are free to assign posterior beliefs for
Prob(High quality|deviation), so we assign the belief to be that a deviating
ﬁrm will thenceforth produce low quality if it chose a low price. Given that
belief, consumers will not visit a ﬁrm that has deviated, and such a ﬁrm has
no incentive to produce high quality. This is a robust belief in the sense that
the ﬁrm actually does proﬁt more from high quality if its price is p∗ or higher;
it has no incentive to cheat on quality given that its price is that high.
Firms have a more delicate choice, which depends on the equilibrium
price. Firms will not deviate to prices less than p∗ because they would lose
all their customers and earn zero payoﬀs. Firms could earn positive proﬁts at
p = p∗ either with the equilibrium high quality or by deviating to low quality,
so we will have to consider both alternatives. Since quality choice will not
aﬀect how many customers a ﬁrm receives, we can look at their choices in
terms of payoﬀs per customer.
If the price is p, then in equilibrium a ﬁrm will receive a proﬁt of (p−ch)
immediately and at the start of each future period. This is equivalent to an
8undiscounted (p − ch) plus an immediate gift of a perpetuity of (p − ch) per
period, so




A ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ per customer is a one-time payoﬀ of (p − cl) if
it gets away with fraud, which has probability θ, minus the expected govern-
ment punishment, which is γF:
πfirm(low quality) = θ(p − cl) − γF. (9)
Thus, the ﬁrm is willing to produce high quality if
(p − ch) +
p − ch
r
= θ(p − cl) − γF. (10)
Solving equation (10) for p yields the value of p∗ in equation (7) above.
The outcome in the optimistic equilibrium is eﬃcient in this model, but
that is only because of the assumption that each consumer buys either one
or zero units. Otherwise, ineﬃciency would arise from the price exceeding
marginal cost, because quality would be high, and consumers would buy, but
less than the surplus-maximizing amount.
It is possible, as Klein and Leﬀer suggested, but not essential, to add
some feature of rent-dissipating competition to the model, in which case the
optimistic equilibrium becomes less eﬃcient but still better than the pes-
simistic equilibrium. Thus, one might assume that any ﬁrm may enter the
market and have an equal chance of participating in the optimistic equilib-
rium if it pays some ﬁxed entry fee. This entry fee would eat up all the
proﬁts from the quality-ensuring price in equilibrium, but consumers would
still earn surplus so long as p∗ < vh. Many of the models in the literature
(e.g., Chan & Leland (1982), Wolinsky (1983), Rasmusen (1989)) use this
kind of nonconvexity to dissipate rents. Rent dissipation is not essential to
the model, however. It is equally valid to assume that some ﬁrms are en-
dowed with good reputations without having to incur any entry fees, or that
consumers are optimistic about the quality of incumbents and pessimistic
about entrants. The essential feature of the model is that entrants cannot
use price competition to secure market share, so the usual force driving even
long-run proﬁts to zero is weakened.
9The Klein-Leﬄer Model and the Three New Assumptions
In the Klein-Leﬄer model, the parameters α, β, and γ all equal zero and
the probability of successfully carrying out a sale is θ = 1, so the quality-
sustaining price in the optimistic equilibrium is, from equation (7):
p
∗ = ch +
rθ(ch − cl)
1 + r − rθ
−
rγF
1 + r − rθ
= ch + r(ch − cl). (11)
The intuition is that if the market price is this high, the ﬁrm would
make enough proﬁt from future sales that it is unwilling to sacriﬁce those
proﬁts for the sake of a one-time gain from producing low-cost low-quality
goods in the present period.
The Klein-Leﬄer model can generate high quality in a competitive mar-
ket without any of the three new assumptions. Later I will show that each of
the three new assumptions can independently generate high quality. First,
though, let us think about all the assumptions in combination. The new
assumptions to be added to the reputation model all add extra inducements
for high quality. We will verify here that these new assumptions have the
eﬀects one would expect.
Proposition 1: The quality-ensuring price p∗ falls in the probability of
spotting a ﬂaw α, the fraction of discerning customers β, and the government
punishment’s probability γ and size F . It rises in the discount rate r.
Proof: Equation (7) says that
p
∗ = ch +
rθ(ch − cl)
1 + r − rθ
−
rγF
1 + r − rθ
. (12)
Recalling that θ ≡ (1−α)(1−β)(1−γ), the derivative of p∗ with respect





















10The last inequality in (13) follows because ∂θ
∂α < 0 and we must have γF <
θ(ch − cl) as explained earlier or the punishment alone will induce ﬁrms to
produce high quality.
Parameter β’s eﬀect can be seen by substituting β for α in equation (13).
As far as the equilibrium value of p∗ is concerned, it does not matter whether
some consumers always detect low quality or all consumers sometimes detect
low quality.
Parameter γ follows the same pattern except that there is an additional
term in its derivative because of its eﬀect through the numerator of −
rγF
1+r−rθ.






(1 + r2)(ch − cl) − r2γF
(1 + r − rθ)2 −
rF
1 + r − rθ
< 0. (14)





1 + r − rθ
< 0. (15)











This demonstrates the comparative statics in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 shows that a variety of forces help to maintain high quality.
If some consumers can observe that quality is low and refuse to buy, that
reduces the payoﬀ to selling low quality, whether this be from consumers who
invariably detect quality that is low or from consumers who merely have a
probability of doing so. The derivatives with respect to α (and β) in the proof
are complicated only by the interaction eﬀect between the various incentives.
In particular, the third term in the fraction in equation (13) has economic
meaning. As the probability that the consumer is discerning rises, so does
the probability that the transaction is interrupted before the government can
punish it. Thus, the direct eﬀect of the discerning consumer on making low
11quality unproﬁtable is somewhat oﬀset by the indirect eﬀect of reducing the
amount of government punishment that occurs, though the indirect eﬀect
cannot outweigh the direct eﬀect.
Government detection also pushes down the proﬁt from low quality,
in two distinct ways. The eﬀect of F is simple: fraud gets punished with
some probability, even though not by enough to entirely deter low quality
without the aid of a quality-inducing proﬁts, and so it reduces the amount
of quality-inducing proﬁts needed: p∗ falls. The probability of punishment,
γ, also contributes to this direct eﬀect. Second, the government prevents the
fraudulent transaction from being completed.
3. The New Assumptions in a Static Setting
The model so far has been of an inﬁnitely repeated game. What happens
as the discount rate goes to inﬁnity, converting it in eﬀect to a static model?
We can apply L’Hospital’s Rule, that
Lim
x → ∞ f(x)/g(x) =
Lim
x → ∞ f0(x)/g0(x)
when the ratio of the derivatives is ﬁnite. It is ﬁnite here if 1 − θ > 0. Ap-
plying the Rule to equation (7) yields:
Lim
r → ∞ p







Thus, a quality-ensuring price greater than marginal cost still exists even
for the one-period model. Assumptions A1, A2, and A3, far from merely
supplementing the reputation model, can each independently give rise to its
feature of high quality at a price above marginal cost.
Proposition 2: Even in a one-period model, for big enough consumer reser-
vation value vh any one of assumptions A1, A2, and A3 yields an optimistic
equilibrium in which quality is high and the equilibrium price is some p∗
exceeding marginal cost.
Proof. We have seen that with inﬁnite periods and positive r the optimistic
equilibrium existed. Now the payoﬀs from high and low quality become, since
future payments are worthless,
πfirm(high quality) = (p − ch) + 0 (18)
12and, just as before,
πfirm(low quality) = θ(p − cl) − γF. (19)
Solving for p∗, these two payoﬀs are equal when
p







So long as θ < 1, which it will be if α > 0, β > 0, or γ > 0, p∗ will
be ﬁnite, so if vh is large enough there exists some price that consumers are
willing to pay for high quality at which ﬁrms prefer producing high quality
to low. 
Proposition 2 is somewhat surprising. It says that what is essential to a
model of quality-ensuring price is not the prospect of future sales. Rather, it
is that there be some loss of sales–possibly present instead of future–which
results from a deviation to low quality. This loss could be from the possibility
that any consumer might spot a ﬂaw, that there is a group of discerning con-
sumers who always spot ﬂaws, or that the government interrupts fraudulent
sales.
That the Klein-Leﬄer idea can be expanded to cover more than repu-
tation is this paper’s main point. I have made it without fully exploring the
equilibria of the static games, however, and without discussing their intuition
in detail. The three assumptions A1, A2, and A3 each have slightly diﬀerent
properties. The rest of the paper will discuss in turn the three static models
that they generate.
(A1) A Probability of Flaw Detection. If the quality is low, then with
probability 0 ≤ α < 1 the consumer observes that fact– he “spots the ﬂaw.”
If the quality is high, he receives no information.
One might think that if all consumers can spot a ﬂaw in a product with
high probability, competitive forces would lead to an equilibrium with price
equal to marginal cost. Any ﬁrm, knowing it would lose most of its sales if
it tried to sell ﬂawed products, would keep its quality high even if it did not
care about future periods, simply because of the potential loss in the current
period.
13The mistake in that reasoning is that when price equals marginal cost
and marginal cost is constant, proﬁts are zero and lost sales volume is no
disincentive. Even if all consumers have probability .99 of observing low
quality, a positive proﬁt margin from the remaining fraction .01 is better
than a zero proﬁt margin from all of them. Hence there exists no equilibrium
with high quality and with price equal to marginal cost.
The pessimistic equilibrium, on the other hand, can exist even in that
extreme situation in which consumers have probability .99 of observing low
quality. In the pessimistic equilibrium, ﬁrms produce low quality at a low
price, and consumers believe that any ﬁrm which deviates to a high price will
produce low quality nonetheless. A ﬁrm which deviates to high quality and
high price will face two obstacles to selling its product. First, consumers will
see its high price, expect low quality from it, and visit other ﬁrms. Second,
even if, going outside the model, a consumer did visit the high-price high-
quality ﬁrm, the fact that he would not observe a ﬂaw would not induce
him to buy at the high price. The consumer knows that he spots ﬂaws with
probability .99, but that gives him probability .01 of not spotting a ﬂaw,
and since his out-of-equilibrium belief is that the product is ﬂawed, he can
rationally retain that belief.
Competition fails to generate high quality at zero-proﬁt prices because
a ﬁrm can do better by cheating and making positive proﬁts from how-
ever many customers fail to spot the cheat. Even if a ﬁrm loses 99% of its
customers, the resulting proﬁt is still positive. It cannot make up for a zero
proﬁt margin with any amount of volume. If the proﬁt margin is even slightly
positive, however, the calculus changes, and ﬁrms start to regret losing cus-
tomers. If the proﬁt margin is high enough, ﬁrms become willing to produce
high quality.
Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimistic Equilibrium
I have already noted that the inﬁnite-period model has multiple equilib-
ria as an implication of the Folk Theorem of repeated games. I passed over
the fact that there are other reasons for multiple equilibria that apply to
either the basic Klein-Leﬄer model or to a single-period model generated by
any of the three assumptions A1, A2, and A3. There is in addition another
reason for multiple equilibria special to A2 that I will discuss later.
14The single-period equilibrium is unique if and only if p∗ > vh, in which
case only the pessimistic equilibrium survives. If ﬂaws are so infrequently
spotted that the quality-maintaining proﬁt margin becomes too high, con-
sumers switch to preferring low quality at a low price, even though high
quality remains socially eﬃcient.
Otherwise, both the pessimistic and optimistic equilibrium exist, but
so does a continuum of other optimisic equilibria with prices in the range
p0 ∈ [p∗,vh]. A strategy combination supporting the equilibrium with price
p is that any ﬁrm which charges p0 or higher produces high quality, any ﬁrm
that charges less than p0 produces low quality, consumers split equally across
the ﬁrms that charge p0 and otherwise do not buy, and, crucially, a consumer’s
out-of-equilibrium belief is that any ﬁrm charging a price less than p0 chose
low quality.
The equilibria with p0 > p∗ lack plausibility. To be sure, this deviation
would not be ruled out by the reasoning of the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion,
which says that if a deviation by one player would be proﬁtable for him if
he were of type T and the other player then believed him to be of type T,
but not proﬁtable for him if he were of type S and the other player believed
him to be of type T. Here, a ﬁrm that was choosing high quality would like
to deviate to p∗ if that would attract consumers, but so would a ﬁrm that
was choosing low quality. Whether a ﬁrm chose high or low quality it would
want more customers, and so it would want customers to believe it had high
quality
Here, however, there is an even stronger reason than the Intuitive Cri-
terion for why a ﬁrm that deviates to p∗ could be expected to produce high
quality: it is in the ﬁrm’s interest to do so. Both high-quality and low-quality
ﬁrms would beneﬁt from higher volume, but if p > p∗, a ﬁrm with high qual-
ity has higher expected proﬁt. It must not only attract customers, but also
keep them once they have had a chance to look for ﬂaws. Thus, a ﬁrm which
has deviated to p 6= p0 where p ≥ p∗ would also wish to choose high quality.
Formally, one way to exclude the implausible optimistic equilibria with
p0 > p∗ would be to allow ﬁrms to revise their quality choice after they
make their price public. The equilibrium with p = p∗ is robust to the order
of moves; the equilibria with p0 > p∗ fail to survive if the ﬁrm can choose
quality after price because the out-of-equilibrium belief that a ﬁrm would
15choose low quality after choosing a price higher than p∗ but not equal to p0
would require irrational behavior by the ﬁrm.
Multiple optimistic perfect bayesian equilibria show up regardless of
whether assumption A1, A2, A3, or none of the assumptions other than
the Klein-Leﬄer assumption of multiple periods is used to generate a model
with quality-inducing proﬁts. Nonetheleess, although the exact value of the
equilibrium price is not pinned down unless restrictions are imposed on out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, the interesting properties of the model are present in
the entire continuum of equilibria: quality is high and proﬁts are positive.
(A2) The Discerning Consumers Model. If a consumer is one of a
fraction 0 ≤ β < 1 of consumers who are “discerning” he observes quality
perfectly once he visit the seller.
Many of us who are ill-informed consumers are happy that better-informed
consumers are out there giving sellers an incentive to keep quality at a rea-
sonable level, so the underlying idea of this model ﬁts our intuition well.
A version of it can found for the monopoly context in chapter 2 of Jean
Tirole’s 1988 book, The Theory of Industrial Organization. In his model,
a monopoly seller chooses quality to be low or high. Some consumers can
observe the quality before buying, while others cannot. In equilibrium, the
seller will always choose high quality if there are suﬃciently many informed
consumers, while if there are not, he will choose high quality with some
probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium that then exists. This paper’s
one-period model with just assumption A2, not A1 or A3, is essentially the
Tirole model transferred to a competitive market.
As we have seen with the comparative statics of parameter α for the
probability of spotting a ﬂaw and parameter β for the fraction of discerning
consumers, the assumptions that all consumers have some chance of spotting
ﬂaws and that some consumers are sure to spot ﬂaws have similar eﬀects. As
in the ﬂaw-spotting model, there exists no equilibrium in which all the ﬁrms
charge p = ch and quality is high, because in such a strategy combination a
ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ would be zero. If it deviated and chose low quality,
then fraction θ of its customers would detect the low quality and turn away
without buying, but it would have a positive proﬁt margin on the remaining
customers, for a positive payoﬀ.
16The pessimistic equilibrium exists in the discerning-consumer model,
but it is less plausible than in the ﬂaw-spotting model. Recall that in the
ﬂaw-spotting model there were two reasons why deviation to high price and
high quality were unproﬁtable. The ﬁrst was that the out-of-equilibrium
belief was that a deviating ﬁrm had low quality, and so no consumer would
visit it. The second was that even if a consumer did visit the deviating ﬁrm,
he would not buy because merely not observing a ﬂaw would not contradict
his belief that the quality was low. Only the ﬁrst reason applies in the
discerning-consumers model. If a discerning consumer did visit a ﬁrm that
had deviated to a high price, he could use direct observation to determine the
quality. Hence, the equilibrium strategy of choosing to visit a ﬁrm charging
a low price and low quality seems absurd compared with choosing to visit
a deviating ﬁrm whose product would yield positive consumer surplus if its
quality were high and zero (because it would be unbought) if it were low.
The optimistic equilibria with p0 ∈ [p∗,vh] continue to exist, though, as
in the ﬂaw-spotting model, they depend on special out-of- equilibrium beliefs
and on the assumption that a ﬁrm cannot change its quality after it has made
public its price.
The discerning-consumers model diﬀers in one important respect from
the ﬂaw-spotting model: besides the pessimistic and optimistic equilibria
described already, it has an additional category of equilibrium, one which
exists even if p∗ > vh and the optimistic equilibrium is infeasible. The three
classes of equilibria for a one- period model using assumption A2, but not
A1 and A3 are listed below, where Class 1 and 3 equilibria always exist, but
Class 2 equilibria require p∗ ≤ vh.
Class 1: Pessimistic Equilibria p = cl and quality is low. Consumers
are pessimistic and believe that quality is low regardless of what prices they
see.
Class 2: Optimistic Equilibria. p ∈ [p∗,vh] and quality is high. Con-
sumers believe that a ﬁrm that deviates to p < p∗ is selling low quality. The
price p∗ is, from our earlier calculations using L’Hospital’s Rule of equation
(17),
p







17Since here α = γ = 0, we can substitute θ = 1 − β and simplify to:
p
∗ = ch +
(1 − β)(ch − cl)
β
. (22)
Class 3: Mixed-strategy Equilibria. Firms charge ˆ p with ˆ p > ch and ˆ p ≤
p∗. They produce high quality with probability φ. Undiscerning consumers
stay home with probability (1 − µ). They visit a random store charging ˆ p
and buy from it with probability µ, so the fraction of consumers who visit
ﬁrms who are discerning is
d =
β
β + (1 − β)µ
> β. (23)
A supporting out-of-equilibrium consumer belief for any equilibrium is that
any ﬁrm charging more or less than ˆ p has low quality, in which case no
consumer will visit that ﬁrm and its deviation will not yield positive proﬁts.
In Class 3 mixed-strategy equilibria, the undiscerning consumers must
be indiﬀerent between visiting a ﬁrm and not, so:
πundiscerning(buys) = πundiscerning(stays home) (24)
so:
φ(vh − p) + (1 − φ)(vl − p) = 0. (25)
Then φvh − φp + (vl − p) − φvl + φp = 0 and φvh − φvl = p − vl. This solves





Firms mix, so they must be indiﬀerent between high and low quality,
and the payoﬀ per visiting consumer must be:
πfirm(high quality) = πfirm(low quality), (27)
so
[β + (1 − β)µ][p − ch] = (1 − β)µ(p − cl), (28)
18so β[p − ch] + (1 − β)µ[p − ch] − (1 − β)µp + (1 − β)µcl = 0 and β[p − ch] −
(1 − β)µch + (1 − β)µcl = 0 and β[p − ch] = µ[(1 − β)ch − (1 − β)cl]. This
solves out to the probability that an undiscerning consumer buys:
µ =
β[p − ch]
(1 − β)(ch − cl)
, (29)
which requires that β[p−ch] < (1−β)(ch−cl), so βp−βch < (1−β)(ch−cl)
so:
p ≤ ch +




The Class 3 mixed-strategy equilibrium has surprising properties, so let
us take some time to explore its intuition. The mixed-strategy equilibria are
discontinuously diﬀerent from the optimistic equilibrium. If the price equals
p∗, then ﬁrms choose high quality as a pure strategy because the loss of
proﬁt from sales to the discerning consumers would outweigh the gain from
lower costs in selling to the undiscerning consumers. If the price is slightly
below p∗, the ﬁrm would rather cut quality and sell only to the low- quality
consumers. The mixed-strategy equilibria works by having some of the undis-
cerning consumers refrain from buying, which by increasing the percentage
of discerning consumers in the buying population allows the quality-ensuring
price to fall. But since undiscerning consumers are earning strictly positive
consumer surplus in the optimistic equilibrium, to induce them to not buy
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium with only a slightly lower price requires
a discontinuously greater probability of low quality. Thus, when p falls be-
low p∗, we need a sudden jump in the probability of fraud to induce some
undiscerning consumers to drop out.
Recall that ˆ p can take any value between ch and p∗, exclusive of those
bounds. If p were to exceed p∗, the payoﬀ from high quality would be strictly
greater than from low quality for the ﬁrms, given that all the discerning
consumers would buy if quality were high and not buy if it were low. One
might imagine a similar category of mixed-strategy equilibria in which the
number of discerning consumers was less because they mixed between buying
and not buying, which would drive the quality- ensuring price above p∗ in
the same way as here the mixing of undiscerning consumers drives the price
below p∗. That cannot happen, though, because a discerning consumers will
never mix when there is some probability of high quality: he can visit a
19ﬁrm and have some probability of buying high quality, which would yield a
positive payoﬀ that would be better than the zero payoﬀ from staying home.
As p falls to ch, the high-price ﬁrm’s margin approaches zero, so the ﬁrm
is more and more tempted to choose low quality. At the same time, however,
the fraction of undiscerning consumers purchasing, µ, is also falling, reducing
the temptation to choose low quality. That is why even a p barely above ch
can support an equilibrium.
If p∗ > vh, the optimistic equilibrium does not exist, but the mixed-
strategy equilibria do. That is the situation where the quality- ensuring price
exceeds the consumer reservation price, where the fraction of the undiscerning
is so great that even at the monopoly price the ﬁrm would be willing to
lose the business of the discerning in order to defraud the undiscerning. The
mixed-strategy equilibria exist, however, because the fraction of undiscerning
buying consumers becomes endogenous and falls to as low as necessary to
support an equilibrium. Tirole (1988) shows this in the monopoly context:
a monopoly can maintain at least some probability of high quality if it faces
some discerning consumers, even though high quality cannot be maintained
as a pure strategy and even though not all buyers can remain active.
If p∗ < vh, both the optimistic equilibrium and the mixed- strategy
equilibria exist as perfect bayesian equilibria. Which of the two is most robust
depends on the particular parameter values. The argument I made earlier
against the optimistic equilibria with p > p∗ was that they depended critically
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and on whether the ﬁrm was able to choose
quality after price or not. The high-price equilibria were fragile because both
a ﬁrm and consumers would be willing to deviate to a p = p∗ equilibrium
if they believed the other would be following it. Here, however, it is not so
clear that if the expected equilibrium were some mixed-strategy equilibrium
that a ﬁrm which deviated would be able to attract discerning customers.
To see why, we must think about the player’s payoﬀs in the optimistic
and the mixed-strategy equilibria. The mixed-strategy equilibria are all
equally attractive to undiscerning consumers, because the undiscerning con-
sumers, indiﬀerent between buying and not buying, earn zero consumer sur-
plus in all of them. The price is lower, but the undiscerning consumer buys
low quality with higher probability. The pure-strategy equilibrium with p∗
and high quality yields positive consumer surplus, however, so if some ﬁrm
20in the mixed-strategy equilibrium were to deviate to p∗ and be believed to
produce high quality, it would attract all the undiscerning consumers.
Firms prefer the optimistic equilibrium for two reasons. In the Class 3
mixed-strategy equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is equal with high and
with low quality, so let us compare the high-quality payoﬀ with p ∈ (ch,p∗) to
the high-quality payoﬀ with the price p∗. Clearly the higher price is better for
the ﬁrm, one reason for preferring p∗. In addition the industry quantity sold
(and thus the quantity per ﬁrm under our assumption of an exogenous-size
interval of ﬁrms) is higher. Thus, ﬁrms prefer the optimistic equilibrium.
The discerning consumers’ preference across equilibria is crucial. If they
do not move to the ﬁrm charging p∗ with high quality, the ﬁrm loses its
incentive for quality. But the discerning consumers’ face a tradeoﬀ. They
have positive expected payoﬀs and like the lower prices of the mixed-strategy
equilibria, but the lower the price, the bigger the probability of low quality,
and consumer surplus that is, ex post, zero. Thus, we must look carefully at
a discerning consumer’s payoﬀ as a function of the price.
A discerning consumer’s expected payoﬀ is:






pvh − vlvh + vlp − p2
vh − vl
, (31)




vh + vl − 2p
vh − vl
(32)
Equating expression (32) to zero to maximize the payoﬀ yields the price that





Note that ˜ p must exceed ch to yield positive proﬁts to the seller.

































This is to be compared with the discerning consumer’s payoﬀ in the pure-
strategy equilibrium with p = p∗ from equation (22):
πdiscerning(p∗) = vh − p∗




Depending on the parameters, discerning consumers might prefer either
the pure-strategy equilibrium with p = p∗ or the mixed- strategy equilib-
rium. If ch is small, then πdiscerning(p∗) is small while πdiscerning(˜ p) is unaf-
fected, so discerning consumers prefer the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In
that case, even if a ﬁrm that deviated to p = p∗ were believed to pro-
duce high quality, it could not lure away the discerning consumers– and
luring away only undiscerning consumers cannot support an equilibrium.
On the other hand, if ch is high, then πdiscerning(p∗) > πdiscerning(˜ p) (e.g., if
vh = 4,vl = 0,ch = 1,cl = 0,β = .9 then 4 − 12/4 < 4 − 1 − 4(.1)/.9).
The discerning-consumer model is trickier than it seems at ﬁrst glance,
but leads us to the same essential conclusion as the ﬂaw- spotting model:
even in a one-period model, we may expect to observe high quality being
produced if the price is above the marginal cost of high quality and ﬁrms
fear deviation to low quality will cost them too much sales volume. The
main diﬀerence between the models is that the discerning model’s prediction
is that even if consumer’s reservation value is close to marginal cost and there
is only a small probability of a consumer who observes quality, high quality
is still possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
22(A3) The Weak Law Model: A Small Probability of Punishment
by the Government. If a ﬁrm tries to sell low quality as high, then with
probability 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 independent of α and β the government interrupts the
transaction and ﬁnes the seller amount F.
Assumption A3 is diﬀerent from A1 and A2 because it rules out con-
sumer observation of quality altogether, as the Klein-Leﬄer model does, but
adds government observation of quality. I noted earlier that if the probability
of government detection of low quality is high enough and the punishment
large enough then the expected punishment alone will deter fraud. Good
laws can allow the market to attain the ﬁrst best by heavily punishing ﬁrms
that falsely advertise high quality or by requiring quality to be high. If such
laws exist, but the probability of detection and the penalty are low, how-
ever, what happens? As before, let us concentrate on just one assumption,
using assumption A3 but not A1 and A2 and restricting ourselves to a single
period.
By our assumption of weak laws (F < F ∗), we have ruled out an equi-
librium in which ﬁrms charge p = ch and quality is high. In such a strategy
combination, a ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ would be zero. If the ﬁrm deviated
and chose low quality, then with probability γ it would lose the sale and in-
cur punishment F, but by deﬁnition of F ∗ this would leave it with a positive
expected payoﬀ.
The pessimistic equilibrium would exist. Firms choose low quality and
p = cl, they advertise their low quality honestly, and consumers visit only
ﬁrms with p = cl. This yields payoﬀs of zero to all players. A ﬁrm cannot
increase its payoﬀ by raising its price because it would lose all its customers,
and a consumer expects a negative payoﬀ if he buys at any higher price. Nor
can the ﬁrm increase its payoﬀ by lying and charging a higher price, because
consumers simply would not believe its claims.
In the optimistic equilibrium, ﬁrms choose high quality and p = p∗,
where the price p∗ is, from our earlier calculations for the general model,
p







23Since here α = β = 0, we can substitute θ = 1 − γ and simplify to
p
∗ = ch +
(1 − γ)(ch − cl)
γ
− F. (37)
A consumer randomly chooses a ﬁrm charging p = p∗ and buys the
product. Out of equilibrium, we postulate that the consumer believes that
prices below p∗ imply low quality and prices above p∗ imply high quality.
The intuition of the weak-law model is as follows. If γ = 0, so the
government had zero probability of detecting a fraudulent transaction, then
quality would of course be low. As soon as γ becomes positive, however, the
ﬁrm faces a tradeoﬀ. It can choose high quality and high production costs
and sell to all consumers who visit it, or it can choose low quality and low
production costs, in which case its margin will rise but its sales will fall. If
the price is high enough, the lost sales are more important than the lower
production cost.
In addition there is the prospect of paying the government penalty F.
That is less important, however, and is not what drives the model. The
government is still useful even if F = 0, so there is no punishment. Deterrence
is still achieved with θ > 0 because there is still a chance the government
will interrupt the transaction and deprive the ﬁrm of its proﬁt. To see the
crucial importance of this, consider the alternative assumption A30:
(A30) If a ﬁrm tries to sell low quality as high, then with probability
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 independent of α and β the government ﬁnes the seller amount
F. The ﬁrm is allowed to keep its proﬁt from the transaction.
It remains true under Assumption (A30) that a large enough penalty
F will deter fraud, and that γ > 0 is needed for the penalty to have any
eﬀect. If F is even slightly too small to deter fraud, however, the equilibrium
moves from the ﬁrst-best of no fraud and high quality to the pessimistic
equilibrium; the optimistic equilibrium will not exist. In the model with our
original assumption (A3) , on the other hand, Proposition 1 applies, and if
the government’s probability of detection γ falls then p∗ rises continuously.
There is a discontinuous rise in fraud when p∗ comes to exceed the reservation
price vh, with a sudden fall in producer proﬁt as that happens, but consumer
welfare approach zero as p∗ = vh anyway, so consumers do not feel the eﬀect
of the fall in government detection discontinuously.
24I have spent considerable time exploring multiple equilibria in the models
based on A1 and A2. The model based on A3 behaves like the one based on
A1, the ﬂaw-spotting model: it has multiple equilibria based on the critical
p lying anywhere in the continuum [p∗,vh], but it does not have the Class 3
mixed-strategy equilibria of the discerning- consumer model. As in the ﬂaw-
spotting model, only the equilibrium at p = p∗ is robust to out-of-equilibrium
beliefs and to whether a ﬁrm can revise quality after choosing price.
One point special to the weak-law model is that it warns us to be careful
about the type of law as well as its severity. Assumption A3 specﬁes “If a ﬁrm
tries to sell low quality as high,” then it becomes subject to penalty. What
if the law were somewhat diﬀerent, and with probability θ, the government
catches a seller who sells low quality, regardless of his claims, conﬁscates the
proﬁts, and imposes penalty F ≥ 0?
If F = 0, nothing changes. If F > 0, however, the pessimistic equilib-
rium disappears. In the pessimistic equilibrium, p = cl, yielding zero proﬁts
from sales, and if a ﬁrm also must pay F with probability θ, its net payoﬀ will
be negative. Hence, the market will dry up entirely, as ﬁrms will, if allowed,
produce nothing at all.
This has an interesting policy implication— that weak measures at-
tempting to ensure high quality may backﬁre and simply destroy the market.
In the present model, this is no great harm, since consumer surplus is zero in
the pessimistic equilibrium anyway due to the assumption that vl = cl. That
was a simplifying assumption, however. More generally, vl > cl but high
quality is eﬃcient because vh − ch > vl − cl. If so, the pessimistic equilib-
rium would yield positive consumer surplus, and punishing low quality would
destroy that surplus.
4. Concluding Remarks
I have shown that the loss of a reputation and future proﬁts is not the
only way that high prices can guarantee product quality. Even in a one-
period model, buyers can trust a high-price, positive-proﬁt seller to produce
high quality if a deviation to low quality would somehow cost him present
proﬁts. I have shown this in three contexts—the loss of sales to discerning
buyers, the loss of sales to buyers lucky enough to spot ﬂaws, and the loss
of sales consequent to government punishment for fraud. In each setting,
25sellers have an incentive to produce high quality which would be too weak
to overcome the proﬁt from cheating if price equalled marginal cost but is
strong enough if prices are above marginal cost.
We should not call these three models “reputation models” since they
are static and do not rely on buyer beliefs about future seller actions in
the way that standard economic models of reputation do. In the everyday
sense of the word, however, they are reputation models, because they are
models in which buyers believe that certain sellers have more to lose than to
gain by cheating and sellers earn rents to those buyer beliefs. Such beliefs
might be repeated over many periods, or might just exist brieﬂy; a reputation
driven by our assumptions A1, A2, or A3 above could be either persistent
or short- lived, depending on how expectations are formed. What is perhaps
most important is that it is not vulnerable to the last-period problem, unlike
reputations in the standard model.
On the other hand, calling these models “product quality models” may
be too limiting. They are, more generally, models of moral hazard, the
choice being not just high versus low quality, but honest versus deceitful
action more generally. Consider, for example, an agent who might be paid
an eﬃciency wage to induce him to choose high eﬀort, but in a one-period
setting. Applying the ﬂaw- spotting model, the agent would choose high
eﬀort because of a probability that the principal would spot his low eﬀort
and break the relationship, which otherwise would have a wage greater than
his reservation wage. Similarly, we could apply the model to a situation in
which a ﬁrm is tempted to engage in opportunistic behavior with respect
to its creditors, but, applying the discerning-consumer model, refrains from
opportunism because it fears losing access to creditors who can observe the
behavior directly. Thus, a static product-quality model may be useful in a
variety of applications.
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